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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
GOLDMAN, SACHS & CO. v. EDELSTEIN: THE
APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
PRINCIPLES IN DEROGATION OF THE
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
In Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Edelstein,' the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals held that where the prospective application of collateral es-
toppel principles might deprive a litigant of its constitutional right to
trial by jury, mandamus is an appropriate remedy for the protection of
that right. Goldman, Sachs was defendant in a number of similar ac-
tions seeking damages for alleged violations of the federal securities
laws.2  Of the fifteen cases pending against Goldman, Sachs which had
been consolidated for pretrial discovery purposes in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, 3 Welch Foods, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.4 in-
1. 494 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1974).
HEREAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
RECENT DEVELOPMENT:
Brief for Petitioners, Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Edelstein, 494 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.
1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioners];
Brief for Respondent Franklin, Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Edelstein, 494 F.2d
76 (2d Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent Franklin].
2. Goldman, Sachs was a dealer in the commercial paper of the Penn Central
Transportation Company. Some thirty-five damage actions, with claims totaling approx-
imately $52,000,000, were brought against Goldman, Sachs by institutions holding Penn
Central promissory notes at the time of that railroad's reorganization. The actions pri-
marily alleged violations of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §
771(2) (1970). Brief for Petitioners at 2-3. The district court exercised original juris-
diction over the cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970). See Welch Foods, Inc.
v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., Civil No. 70-4811-CLB (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 30, 1974), where
the court denied Goldman, Sachs' motion to dismiss several of the claims against it for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In May, 1974, the SEC commenced its own enforcement action against Goldman,
Sachs, and a consent decree resulted. SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I 94,556 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 1974).
3. All thirty-five damage actions pending against Goldman, Sachs were consoli-
dated for pretrial discovery purposes by the Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970). Fifteen of the consolidated cases commenced
in New York were eventually assigned for all purposes to the Honorable David N. Edel-
stein, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. Brief for Petitioners at 3.
4. Civil No. 70-4811 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 17, 1974).
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volved by far the largest claim.5  Welch was to be tried -to a jury,6
and from the outset it was treated by the court and by all concerned
parties as the "bellwether" case for trial.7  However, toward the close
of the discovery period the district judge unexpectedly announced that
another of the consolidated cases, Franklin Savings Bank v. Levy,"
would be tried first. All parties had waived their right to a jury trial in
Franklin.9 Because Franklin and Welch raised identical claims based
on substantially the same proof,10 Goldman, Sachs was fearful that an
adverse judgment in Franklin might have the effect of collaterally es-
topping it from seeking a jury resolution in Welch on the issue of its
liability. Goldman, Sachs was unsuccessful, however, in its efforts to
have the district judge delay Franklin; it therefore filed a petition with
5. 494 F.2d at 77. Welch represented $23,000,000 in claims against Goldman,
Sachs, arising out of several purchases of Penn Central commercial paper. Brief for
Petitioners at 3, app. A at 33; Brief for Respondent Franklin at 5. The complaint raised
questions as to
(1) the creditworthiness in 1969-70 of Penn Central, (2) whether or not
Goldman, Sachs possessed adverse non-public information affecting the
merchantability or creditworthiness of the Penn Central's notes, (3) whether
the notes were in fact "prime," and if they were not, (4) whether Goldman,
Sachs knew of their infirmities; (5) should have known; or (7) [sic] con-
ducted itself in a reckless manner so that its customers did not learn the truth.
Welch Foods, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., Civil No. 70-4811-CLB at 23
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1974).
6. The plaintiffs in Welch demanded a jury trial when they filed their original'
complaint. Brief for Respondent Franklin at 3-4. Goldman, Sachs was entitled to argue
its case to a jury, even if the Welch plaintiffs had later unilaterally attempted to with-
draw their demand. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d).
7. Of the fifteen consolidated cases pending in the Southern District of New York,
Welch was the first to be filed, and discovery in that .ase was conducted on an acceler-
ated schedule. Throughout the pretrial proceedings, "the parties and the court, by their
frequent references to procedures to be followed in presenting evidence to the jury, made
it abundantly clear that Welch was to be tried first." 494 F.2d at 77.
8. Civil No. 71-882 (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 1, 1971). Franklin represented a
$500,000 claim against Goldman, Sachs arising out of a single purchase of Penn Central
commercial paper. Brief for Petitioners, app. A at 33; Brief for Respondent Franklin
at 5.
9. 494 F.2d at 79. Nothing in the briefs of either the petitioners or respondent
Franklin Savings Bank, and nothing in the transcripts of the two pretrial hearings before
the district judge, indicates why Goldman, Sachs waived its jury rights in the Franklin
case. See Brief for Petitioners at 4, 15-16, app. A at 19-20, app. B at 46-49; Brief for
Respondent Franklin at 3, 10-11.
The Goldman court did not speculate as to the reasons for the waiver, but it went
to considerable lengths in its opinion to demonstrate that the parties assumed "from the
outset" that Welch would be the first case to go to trial. 494 F.2d at 77. Since Frank-
lin was filed more than three months after Welch, the court might reasonably have in-
ferred that Goldman, Sachs waived a jury in Franklin only because it assumed that the
issue of its liability would first be tried to a jury in Welch. The court's repeated empha-
sis on "the anticipated order of trials" suggests that just such an inference was drawn.
Id. at 78.
10. 494 F.2d at 77.
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the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the lower court
to stay its order for the non-jury trial of Franklin until the completion
of the jury trial of Welch. Agreeing with the petitioners that "for the
district court to proceed with the non-jury trial of Franklin threatens de-
struotion of Goldman, Sachs' important collateral right to a jury
trial,"" the Second Circuit directed the distriot court either to proceed
first with the trial of Welch or, in the alternative, to consolidate Welch
and Franklin for simultaneous trial. 2
The decision in Goldman to grant mandamus13 was not unani-
mous. While all three circuit judges agreed that mandamus is war-
ranted where necessary to protect the constitutional right to trial by
jury,14 the court divided over the question of whether Goldman, Sachs'
11. Id. at 78.
12. Id. There were four plaintiffs in Welch. One plaintiff eventually settled his
claim in July, 1974, and the balance of the Welch case went to trial in the Southern
District of New York on September 9, 1974. Franklin was stayed indefinitely, pending
completion of the Welch trial. Telephone Interview with Robert S. Stitt, Thacher,
Proffitt & Wood, counsel for Franklin Savings Bank, in New York City, Sept. 4, 1974.
Goldman, Sachs eventually lost a jury verdict in Welch, and judgment was entered
against it on October 17, 1974. Welch Foods, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., Civil No.
70-4811 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 17, 1974). To the suggestion that the jury loss would make
it more difficult for Goldman, Sachs to defend other damage actions pending against
it, one company official reportedly asserted that Goldman, Sachs would fight the Welch
verdict and that, in any event, every case was different. The official was quoted as de-
claring, "That's one case, there are 35 to go." BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 19, 1974, at 50.
Apparently, none of the parties in Goldman wanted Welch and Franklin consoli-
dated for trial. Telephone Interview with Robert S. Stitt, supra. The jury trial of
Welch was expected to take at least twice as long as the non-jury trial of Franklin,
Brief for Petitioners, app. A at 26, 34; Brief for Respondent Franklin at 5, so consolida-
tion would have put the plaintiffs in Franklin to considerable additional expense. In his
dissent in Goldman, Judge Oakes also suggested that evidence adduced in Franklin might
have prejudiced the Welch plaintiffs and that consolidation might have made the judge's
instructions more confusing to the jury as well as more difficult to draft. 494 F.2d at
79.
13. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy appropriate "only in the exceptional case
where there is a clear abuse of discretion or 'usurpation of judicial power.'" Bankers
Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953). See Pet Milk Co. v. Ritter,
323 F.2d 586 (10th Cir. 1963), where the Tenth Circuit refused to order a stay of pro-
ceedings in-an antitrust action while appeals were pending from an earlier judgment in
a virtually identical case. The Pet court noted, however, that mandamus has been used
on some occasions to facilitate review of a district court's refusal to stay proceedings,
id. at 588, citing La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1952). Cf. Schlagenhauf
v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964) (power of circuit court of appeals to review on a petition
for mandamus the construction and application of a new rule of procedure).
14. See 494 F.2d at 78-79. The Goldman majority relied on Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). In that case the Supreme Court implied that it was the
duty of federal courts of appeals to grant mandamus in aid of the right to trial by jury.
Id. at 472. See also Bruce v. Bohanon, 436 F.2d 733, 735 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 918 (1971); Robine v. Ryan, 310 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1962).
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rights were actually in danger. As grounds for its conclusion that a
threat was present, the majority appealed to dictum appearing in an
earlier Second Circuit decision, Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc.,15
which had suggested that a party in a jury trial could be bound by the
non-jury findings of an earlier suit. The Crane court, in advancing
this suggestion, had challenged the holding of a Fifth Circuit case,
Rachal v. Hill,' which had refused to apply collateral estoppel prin-
ciples in derogation of the right to jury trial. Thus, by invoking the
dictum in Crane which had been critical of Rachal, the Goldman court
apparently elected to renew its attack on the Fifth Circuit case in an
attempt to expand the scope of collateral estoppel in the Second Circuit.
Under -the doctrine of collateral estoppel, 17 a party to a lawsuit
may not relitigate those matters which have already been litigated and
determined in a previous suit in which it was also a party.' 8 The doc-
trine reflects, in part, a policy interest in judicial economy;19 but this
15. 490 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1973). For a discussion of the Crane case, see notes
65-71 infra and accompanying text.
16. 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971). For a discus-
sion of the Rachal case, see notes 26-33 infra and accompanying text.
17. A standard work on the doctrine of collateral estoppel is Scott, Collateral Estop-
pel by Judgment, 56 HRv. L. REv. 1 (1942). Professor Scott established the following
minimum requirements that must be met in order for a determination in one suit to pre-
clude relitigation of the same matter in a subsequent suit: The matter must have been
litigated in the first action; the matter must have been determined by the judgment in
the first action; and this determination must have been essential to the judgment in the
first action. Id. at 10-11. See also Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948);
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); Nichols v. Alker, 231 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956); The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68(1) (1942);
Note, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 647 (1952).
18. The district court exercised original jurisdiction over the damage actions brought
against Goldman, Sachs. See note 2 supra. The Goldman court was therefore con-
cerned with the doctrine of collateral estoppel only as it had been applied in the federal
courts. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313 (1971), where the Supreme Court declared that "[iun federal-question cases,
the law applied is federal law. . . '[11n non-diversity cases, . . . the federal courts
will apply their own rule of res judicata.'" Id. at 324 n.12, quoting Heiser v. Woodruff,
327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946). See Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div.,
327 F.2d 944, 954-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); Fink v. Coates, 323
F. Supp. 988, 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); cf. Lynne Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print
Works Co., 453 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3d Cir. 1972).
19. See Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 470 (1958); Moore v. United States,
360 F.2d 353, 356 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967). The doctrine
of collateral estoppel "constitutes a powerful instrument for the expeditious and econom-
ical handling of massive litigation . . . affecting large numbers of people." Currie, Civil
Procedure: Tire Tempest Brews, 53 CALiF. L. REv. 25, 36 (1965). But'cf. Pollasky,
Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L. REv. 217, 219-22 (1954).
See generally Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM.
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interest has always yielded where precluding the relitigation of issues
would be unfair to the party resisting estoppel.20 It was in the interests
of fairness, for example, that federal courts in the past refused to bind
a litigant to the findings of an earlier suit unless its opponent would also
have been bound.21  However, this judge-made rule2 2 that estoppel
must be mutual has been widely repudiated in recent years. 23  Accom-
panying -the erosion of the mutuality rule has been a growing realization
that, while considerations of justice and fairness to the parties may re-
striot the application of collateral estoppel principles in a given case,
justice also requires that a litigant ordinarily be limited -to a single,
"full and fair opportunity" to be heard on a given issue.24  By abro-
L. REv. 1457 (1968), where liberalized rules of joinder are recommended as an alterna-
tive to collateral estoppel for the efficient resolution of multiparty controversies.
20. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 328 (1971); Ritchie v. Landau, 475 F.2d 151, 155 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973); RESTATE-
MENT OF JUDGMENTS § 70 (1942).
21. See, e.g., Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 642-46 (1936); Postal Tel. Cable Co.
v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining
& Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912); cf. Adriaanse v. United States, 184 F.2d 968,
969-70 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 932 (1951). For general discussions of
the mutuality rule at common law, as well as its traditional justifications, see Moore &
Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TuL. L. REv. 301 (1961);
Seavy, Res Judicata with Reference to Persons Neither Parties nor Privities-Two Cali-
fornia Cases, 57 HAnv. L. REv. 98 (1943); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables:
Parties, 50 IowA L. REv. 27 (1964).
22. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 320 (1971).
23. See, e.g., Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586, 589 n.10 (5th Cir. 1974); Hum-
phreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 671 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1970 (1974),
Cardillo v. Zyla, 486 F.2d 473, 475 (1st Cir. 1973); Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp.
v. Hogan, 476 F.2d 1182, 1187 (7th Cir. 1973); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944,
954 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964). A leading case in the modem trend
away from the mutuality requirement is Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). For some early reservations as to the
requirement's unqualified abrogation, see Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Lim-
its of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. Rv. 281 (1957). Professor Currie repudiated
his reservations, for the most part, in Currie, supra note 19.
24. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 328-29, 333, 347 (1971); Brightheart v. McKay, 420 F.2d 242, 245 n.4 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); United States v. Weber, 396 F.2d 381, 389-90 (3d Cir. 1968); Maryland
v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298, 303-04 (D. Md. 1967); Schwartz v. Public
Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969).
The court in United States v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash.
1962), aff'd as to res judicata and mutuality sub nom. United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener,
335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), was one of the first to recognize that considerations of
justice, rather than economy, constitute the principal reason for limiting the number of
times that a party may litigate an issue. United Airlines was defendant in numerous
damage actions arising out of a mid-air collision between one of its passenger carriers
and a military transport. After it had lost a jury verdict in one action brought in Cali-
fornia, the airline company was estopped "in the interests of justice" from contesting
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gating the requirement of mutuality, courts have concluded, in effect,
that whether the opportunity afforded a litigant in a prior adjudica-
tion was "full and fair" no longer depends on whether the party assert-
ing estoppel also participated in the earlier suit. Where mutuality is
lacking, courts now tend to focus on the particular facts of a given case
in order to determine whether the application of collateral estoppel
principles would work an injustice.25
In Rachal v. Hill2" the Fifth Circuit considered -the equities of
allowing a plaintiff in a jury trial -to bind his opponent to the non-jury
findings of an earlier suit in which the plaintiff had not participated.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had brought an in-
junction action against defendants Rachal and Hunnicutt in which it
was determined that they had violated the federal securities laws.
This action carried no right to a jury trial. Once judgment had been
entered, Hill brought a private action against Rachal and Hunnicutt
for damages arising out of the same alleged violations. He filed a
motion for partial summary judgment as to the issue of liability, and
the trial court granted his motion on the ground that the defendants
were collaterally estopped by the findings in the earlier suit.27  The
Fifth Circuit reversed, however, authorizing total relitigation before a
its liability in subsequent actions brought in Washington and Nevada. 216 F. Supp.
at 729.
25. One court has observed: "The rule of non-mutuality is not a general one but
a limited one to be determined by the facts and circumstances in each case whether or
not it should be applied." United States v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 726
(E.D. Wash. 1962), aff'd as to res judicata and mutuality sub nom. United Airlines, Inc.
v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964). See Currie, supra note 19, at 31, where the
author declared: "The mutuality rule is deservedly dead, and. . any reservations about
the totality of its demise should rest on particularized inquiry rather than on rules of
thumb." See also Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir.
1971) (no collateral estoppel where its application would contravene public policy or
result in manifest injustice).
Many factors have been recognized by federal courts applying the "full and fair op-
portunity" test as possible grounds for refusing to bind a litigant to the findings of a
given case. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation,
402 U.S. 313, 333 (1971) (no opportunity to choose defendant, forum, and time of
suit); James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 461-62 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971) (lack of initiative in bringing suit, defending relatively
small claim, no opportunity to choose or change forum); Brightheart v. McKay, 420
F.2d 242, 245 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (litigating relatively small claim, lack of initiative
in bringing suit); Travelers Corp. v. Boyer, 301 F. Supp. 1396, 1403 (D. Md. 1969)
(inadequate representation of counsel). For examples of the test's application in the
Second Circuit, see note 85 infra.
26. 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971).
27. 435 F.2d at 61.
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jury of issues which were identical to those that had been resolved in
the SEC action.28
The Rachal court first acknowledged that federal courts no longer
require mutuality as a precondition of collateral estoppel. 0 It noted,
however, that under Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 0 a litigant is
entitled to have its legal claims tried before a jury in an action where
legal and equitable claims are joined;"' thus, defendants Rachal and
Hunnicutt would have received a jury trial on the issue of liability if
Hill had been a party plaintiff in the SEC action seeking an injunc-
tion.3 2 The court reasoned that, viewed from this perspective, it would
be "anomalous" to deprive the defendants of their right to trial by jury
simply because the equitable and legal claims against them were
brought in successive actions."
The Fifth Circuit's use of the Beacon Theatres case has been crit-
icized.34 Furthermore, the rule which Rachal announced35 has en-
28. Id. at 64-65.
29. Id. at 61-62. While apparently repudiating the mutuality requirement, the
Fifth Circuit nevertheless asserted that "special considerations [are] required to insure
justice in cases where mutuality of parties is lacking." Id. at 63 n.5. The court did
not elaborate as to the nature of these considerations.
30. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
31. Beacon Theatres involved a dispute between two movie theatre operators, Fox
and Beacon, over "first run" exclusivity rights which Fox enjoyed as a result of contracts
between himself and several movie distributors. Anticipating that Beacon would bring
an action against him for damages under the federal antitrust laws, Fox sued Beacon
for a declaratory judgment that would have settled many aspects of their dispute. Id.
at 502-03. Beacon subsequently made his antitrust allegations in a counterclaim against
Fox. Although Beacon demanded a jury trial of the issues that his counterclaim raised,
the district judge ordered an initial trial, without a jury, of those issues common to the
equitable claim and legal counterclaim. Id. at 503-04. Beacon filed a petition for man-
damus which was denied by the court of appeals, but the Supreme Court reversed, direct-
ing that a jury trial of the counterclaim precede any resolution of issues by the court.
Id. at 506-08.
32. 435 F.2d at 63-64.
33. Id. at 64.
34. See Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment
on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARv. L. REv. 442 (1971). The authors challenged the Fifth Cir-
cuit's use of the Beacon Theatres case. They pointed out that in reversing the denial
of mandamus, the Supreme Court assumed that if the district judge were to proceed first
with the trial of Fox's equitable claim, then the principles of collateral estoppel "might"
bar a jury resolution of many of the issues raised by Beacon's counterclaim. 359 U.S.
at 504. It was in order to avoid such foreclosure, according to the authors, that the
Supreme Court directed that the legal counterclaim be tried first. Shapiro & Coquillette,
supra, at 446. They insisted that, contrary to the Fifth Circuit's reading of the case,
the Supreme Court never implied that jury trial considerations should limit the applica-
tion of collateral estoppel principles. Id. at 446-47. Thus, the authors found nothing
"anomalous" about binding Rachal and Hunnicutt to the findings in the SEC injunction
action, preferring instead to limit Beacon Theatres to the proposition that "a jury trial
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joyed only limited support among the circuits. While several federal
courts have cited the Fifth Circuit's threshold repudiation of the mu-
tuality rule with approval, 8 only four courts outside of the Second
Circuit have referred to Rachal in the course of balancing collateral
estoppel principles against the right to trial by jury.37 Two of the
latter cases simply found comparison to Rachal instructive;38 and in
another, a district court in the Fifth Circuit merely speculated that un-
der Rachal, a defendant who suffers an adverse judgment by a court
sitting in admiralty might overcome collateral estoppel should he sub-
sequently be sued on a legal claim. 9
must be given on an issue not yet adjudicated, but. . . an issue need not be relitigated
once it has been decided by the court sitting alone." Id. at 447 (emphasis in original).
Having distinguished the implications of Beacon Theatres from the holding in
Rachal, Shapiro and Coquillette undertook a brief historical inquiry into the right to trial
by jury at common law. They concluded that "in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries, determinations in equity were thought to have as much force as deter-
minations at law, and. . . the possible impact on jury trial rights was not viewed with
concern." Id. at 455-56. The authors were consequently persuaded that "[i]f collateral
estoppel is otherwise warranted, the jury trial question should not stand in the way."
Id. at 456; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, comment d at 150-51 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1973) (jury trial question should not stand in the way of collateral estoppel
where mutuality is present).
35. In framing the question before it, the Rachal court emphasized that the defen-
dants' "present adversary was not a party" in the earlier SEC injunction action. 435 F.2d
at 63. Since the court also displayed some reluctance in its repudiation of the mutuality
requirement, id. at 63 n.5, the Rachal rule may be formulated in the following terms:
A party in a jury trial is not bound by the non-jury findings of an earlier suit if those
findings are not binding on its opponent as well.
36. See Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 587, 589 n.10 (5th Cir. 1974); James Tal-
cott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 461 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
940 (1971); J.M. Woodhull, Inc. v. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 62 F.R.D. 58, 61
(S.D. Ohio 1974); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561 n.9 (S.D.
Fla. 1974); In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 74, 82 (S.D.
Fla. 1973).
37. The Fifth Circuit could find no case directly on point with Rachal; thus it
turned to the "plethora of analogous cases" holding that a right to trial by jury exists
where equitable and legal claims are joined in a single action. 435 F.2d at 63. If courts
are indeed rarely called upon to give preclusive effect to the findings of a judge sitting
in equity when the defendant there is subsequently sued by a different plaintiff on a
legal claim, this fact may explain why the Rachal case has generated so little response
since it was decided.
38. SEC v. Crofters, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 236, 261 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd, 493 F.2d
1304 (6th Cir. 1974) (no requirement that the SEC, once admitted to a bankruptcy ac-
tion, must try its injunction suit in that forum); Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F.
Supp. 914, 921 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (presence of both equitable and legal claims cannot
defeat the right to a jury trial of the latter).
39. Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561-62 n.9 (S.D. Fla.
1974). Hernandez involved an effort on the part of six ship passengers to have their
case against a shipowner certified as a class action. One reason the court gave for
granting certification was its fear that if the passengers were to prosecute separate ac-
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Only the Third Circuit, in Lynne Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston
Print Works Co.,40 has voiced support for the Rachal holding to any
significant degree. A buyer of printed cloth had refused to pay for the
goods on the grounds that they were "defective," and the seller sought
arbitration pursuant to a provision in the contract for sale. The arbi-
trators determined that the cloth was not "defective" and ordered an
award for the purchase price. The buyer subsequently sued the manu-
facturer for damages, claiming that the cloth was "not fit for its in-
tended purpose." Despite the earlier findings in the arbitration pro-
ceeding,41 the Third Circuit held that the buyer was not collaterally
estopped from arguing its case against the manufaoturer to a jury. In
reaching this conclusion, the Lynne court approvingly offered the fol-
lowing version of the Rachal holding: "[B]ecause a jury trial was
unavailable to the defendants in the first action,. . . the plaintiff could
not deprive defendant of that right in a damage suit by invoking col-
lateral estoppel. ' '42
The initial reaction to Rachal within the Second Circuit was also
favorable. At the -time the decision was issued the Second Circuit was
in the throes of the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation.4 3 An action had been
brought by the SEC against the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company (TGS)
in the Southern District of New York, charging that TGS had violated
the federal securities laws by issuing a press release which discussed the
company's exploratory activities in Canada but failed to mention the
presence of valuable ore deposits discovered there." All parties waived
their right to a jury trial. After several years of litigation, it was ul-
tions, the shipowner would be required to defend against one plaintiff after another until
a judgment was obtained. Then, by raising this judgment, all subsequent plaintiffs could
collaterally estop the shipowner from denying its liability. Id. at 561. The court sug-
gested, however, that as to any subsequent actions against the shipowner which did not
lie in admiralty, and where the right to trial by jury would therefore obtain, there would
be no collateral estoppel effect. Id. at 561-62 n.9.
40. 453 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1972).
41. The Lynne court was inclined to distinguish the issue whether the cloth was "de-
fective" from whether it was "not fit for its intended purpose." Id. at 1183.
42. Id. at 1184 (emphasis added). An important similarity between Rachal and
Lynne is that there was no right to a jury trial in the first proceeding of either case.
Goldman, Sachs, on the other hand, was entitled to a jury trial in Franklin but waived
its right. See note 9 supra. For a discussion of how this waiver distinguishes Goldman
from Rachal (and Lynne), see text accompanying notes 81-85 infra.
43. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modi-
fied, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). For a helpful sum-
mary of the Texas Gulf Sulphur controvery and its adjudication in the courts, see Note,
Texas Gulf Sulphur: Its Holding and Implications, 22 VAND. L. REV. 359 (1969).
44. The SEC brought its action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1970), against both the company and several of its officers.
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timately determined that the press release was misleading to the rea-
sonable investor using due care and that the framers of the release
failed to exercise due diligence in its issuance.45 Most of the former
shareholders with claims against TGS for damages arising out of the
press release controversy brought their suits before the same New York
district judge who heard the original SEC action. There they raised
the earlier findings of -the court in an effort to estop TGS from reliti-
gating the issue of its liability, but in Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.4 the district court refused to bind TGS.47
The Cannon court suggested that TGS might not have waived a
jury trial in the SEC action if the shareholders had also been parties
plaintiff there, and on this basis it refused to deprive the defendants
of a jury trial where the private claims had been brought separately.48
While this conclusion was ostensibly reached "in the light" of the Ra-
chal case,49 it is not certain that by invoking Rachal the district court
intended to endorse unreservedly the Fifth Circuit rule limiting the ap-
plication of collateral estoppel principles.50 This aspect of the Texas
45. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified,
446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S 1005 (1971).
46. 323 F. Supp. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
47. Prior to the filing of any damage actions in New York, four former sharehold-
ers who claimed that they had sold their stock prematurely in reliance upon the press
release brought suit against TGS in Utah. In Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309
F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970), modified sub nom. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), 405 U.S. 918 (1972), the
Utah district court held TGS liable for compensatory damages on the grounds that the
press release was misleading and intentionally deceptive. While Reynolds was still on
appeal to the Tenth Circuit, several former shareholders who were engaged in similar
actions in New York attempted to bind TGS to the findings of the Utah district court.
In Fink v. Coates, 323 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the New York district court re-
fused to collaterally estop TGS. The Fink court noted that TGS had unsuccessfully
sought to transfer the Utah actions to New York, where most of the stockholder claims
had been filed, and that the claims involved in Reynolds were for relatively small
amounts. The court also questioned whether the evidence presented in Reynolds sup-
ported the conclusions of the Utah district judge. Id. at 990.
48. 323 F. Supp. at 993-94. It is not clear whether the court considered it likely
that TGS would not have waived a jury. See note 50 infra.
49. Id. at 994.
50. For a suggested formulation of the Fifth Circuit rule, see note 35 supra. The
Cannon opinion does not compel the conclusion that this rule was accepted by the New
York district court since Rachal and Cannon are distinguishable on their facts. Whereas
the original action brought by the SEC against defendants Rachal and Hunnicutt carried
no right to a jury trial, TGS was entitled to a jury but waived its right. It could be
that the Cannon court refused to collaterally estop TGS on the basis that if the share-
holders had been parties plaintiff in the first action, TGS probably would not have
waived its right. Having presided over both cases, the New York district judge was in
the best position to reach such a conclusion.
Under an analysis of Cannon which emphasizes TGS's waiver in the SEC action,
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Gulf Sulphur litigation was never clarified by the Second Circuit, how-
ever, since a settlement was eventually reached on the claims involved
in the Cannon case. 51
Essex Systems Co. v. Steinberg52 is the only other case from the
Second Circuit in which a court has indicated some approval of Ra-
chal. At issue in Essex was a contract for the sale of securities. As the
result of a dispute over the purchase price, the buyer refused to attend
the closing, and the seller brought suit for specific performance in New
Jersey state court. The buyer eventually counterclaimed in New Jersey
for rescission and for damages,5" but he then filed his own suit, also
seeking rescission and damages, in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York.54 At filing, he requested an injunction staying
the New Jersey proceedings pending resolution of his federal action,"
but the district court denied this request.
Arguing in the district court for an injunotion, the buyer contended
that if the New Jersey court were to reach judgment first, any adverse
findings there would be binding on him in federal court. He feared
that he might consequently be deprived of his right to trial by jury."
Agreeing with the buyer that some prejudice was possible, the dis-
trict court conceded that "the purpose of the seventh amendment would
best be served by limiting the collateral estoppel or res judicata effect
of the state decree so as not to foreclose an independent determination
of the claim or claims triable by jury."58  The court cited Rachal as
the Rachal rule may not have been necessary to the holding of the court. For a discus-
sion of jury waiver as a possible ground for allowing a party to relitigate an issue under
the "full and fair opportunity" test, see note 85 infra and accompanying text. It should
be noted, however, that as in Rachal, nothing in the Cannon opinion indicates that join.
der of the SEC and private damage claims was actually considered.
51. See Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
52. 335 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 447 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir. 1971).
53. The buyer unsuccessfully attempted to have a New York state court settle the
dispute. After the seller had instituted suit in New Jersey, the buyer brought an action
for rescission and damages in New York. However, the seller obtained an order from
the New Jersey court restraining the buyer from proceeding with his suit. 335 F. Supp.
at 300.
54. The buyer's federal action was brought under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1970).
55. An injunction was sought under 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
56. The Essex court referred to the New Jersey action in which the buyer was the
defendant as "clearly equitable." 335 F. Supp. at 301. But the court did not indicate
whether the buyer had demanded a jury trial of the issues raised by his counterclaim
in New Jersey. If the counterclaim asserted a legal claim (a question left unanswered
by the court), then the buyer was entitled to a jury trial in the state suit. See Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
57. 335 F. Supp. at 302.
58. Id.
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authority for this proposition59 but then promptly declined to balance
the requirements of full faith and credit against the right to trial by
jury "in the absence of demonstrated necessity for doing So. ''60 Whether
the Essex court actually approved the result in Rachal was cast in
further doubt by its subsequent observation that "if estoppel should
eventuate, that would not be any hardship in the absence of a showing
of improper trying of the facts in New Jersey, which of course is not
even alleged."'"
In a memorandum opinion affirming the order of the trial judge
in Essex,62 the court of appeals did not address the collateral estoppel
issues raised below. Thus, it is not clear whether the appellate court
intended to approve the district court's ambivalent expressions of sup-
port for Rachal. The Second Circuit did, however, on two subsequent
occasions indicate skepticism with respect to the Rachal holding. In
SEC v. Everest Management Corp.,63 the court refused to allow victims
of an alleged securities fraud to intervene in an SEC enforcement ac-
tion. The proposed intervenors had argued that under Rachal, find-
ings in the SEC action would not have any collateral estoppel effect in
subsequent private actions based on the same transactions. Conse-
quently, they feared that total relitigation of the issues would be re-
quired unless intervention were allowed; but the Everest court, clearly
unimpressed by this argument, preferred not to have the SEC action
"bogged down" by the introduction of additional parties.64
The disinclination of the Second Circuit to follow Rachal was
again apparent in Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc. 5 Crane in-
volved the efforts of two competitors in -the plumbing industry (Stand-
ard and Crane) to take over a publicly-held company (Air Brake).
The directors of Air Brake had agreed to merge with Standard, but
stockholder approval of the agreement was necessary in order for the
merger to be consummated. In anticipation of a vote on 'the merger
question, both Standard and Crane proceeded to buy up all available
shares of Air Brake stock. Crane eventually brought an action against
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. It is not clear from this remark whether the Essex court intended to suggest
that issue resolution by the New Jersey court would be "proper" for purposes of sustain-
ing a plea of collateral estoppel in federal court. If so, the district judge's concern for
the buyer's right to trial by jury was hardly consistent with the spirit of the Rachal deci-
sion.
62. Essex Sys. Co. v. Steinberg, 447 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir. 1971) (mer.).
63. 475 F.2d 1236 (2d Cir. 1972).
64. id. at 1240 n.5.
65. 490 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Standard, alleging that Standard had violated the federal securities
laws in a series of open market cash purchases. It sought to enjoin
Standard both from voting its Air Brake stock on the question of the
proposed merger and from actually merging with the Air Brake Com-
pany.6  Hearing the case without a jury, the district court dismissed
Crane's complaint, and the merger of Air Brake and Standard was
consummated within a few days. However, the Second Circuit re-
versed the dismissal on appeal and remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of remedies.01  Since the merger had already
been consummated, there was some question on remand as to what re-
lief would be available to Crane short of divestiture or separation.
The Second. Circuit held that the district court, sitting without a jury,
could award damages as part of any equitable relief to which Crane
might be entitled.68
The holding in Crane was based in part on Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover.69 Referring briefly to the Fifth Circuit's use of that
case in Rachal, the Crane court distinguished Rachal on the basis that
Rachal involved two separate proceedings brought by different plain-
tiffs.7 0 The court went on to observe that it was
not at all sure that Rachal was correctly decided . . . . [E]quity de-
66. Crane's complaint also included a prayer for "such other and further relief as
may be just and proper." Id. at 335.
67. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). The court of appeals determined that through its market
activities Standard intentionally created the appearance of an extraordinary demand for
Air Brake stock, thereby deterring shareholders from tendering to Crane. 419 F.2d at
793.
68. 490 F.2d at 341-43. The Second Circuit emphasized that Crane's injunction ac-
tion carried no right to a jury trial when it was initially filed. Id. at 342-43.
69. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). For a summary of the Beacon Theatres case, see note
31 supra.
In contesting the propriety of a damage award, Standard had argued that under Bea-
con Theatres damages could only be assessed against a party that had been afforded the
opportunity to contest its liability in a jury trial. 490 F.2d at 342. However, the Sec-
ond Circuit refused to apply Beacon Theatres in this manner. It pointed out that
whereas the merits of Crane's injunction action had already been tried to a judge sitting
in equity, the question of the proper order for trying jury and non-jury issues had been
presented to the Supreme Court before any trial had occurred. Id. at 341-42. Indeed,
the Crane court asserted that the "very basis of Beacon Theatres" was that a non-jury
resolution of an equitable claim might limit the issues that a jury .could hear in a subse-
quent trial of an action for money damages. Id. at 342.
The Second Circuit credited Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 34, with a proper
analysis of the Beacon Theatres case. Id. at 343.
70. 490 F.2d at 343 n.15. The Rachal court repudiated the mutuality requirement,
albeit reluctantly. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. Thus, it would not appear
that the case can be meaningfully distinguished from Crane solely on the grounds that
it involved successive proceedings with different plaintiffs.
[Vol. 1974:970
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
crees in the eighteenth century had preclusive effect in actions at law,
and the erosion of the mutuality requirement for collateral estoppel,
...arguably should apply to them to the same extent as to judgments
at law.7'
Oddly enough, the majority in Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Edel-
stein72 did not mention Rachal by name, but made only an oblique
reference to the case by citing the passage from Crane quoted above. 73
This dictum appearing in Crane raised some doubt in the mind of the
majority "as to whether a prior non-jury trial of the same issues in one
case will estop a jury resolution of them in another.174  On the basis
of this "doubt," the Goldman majority concluded that Goldman, Sachs'
right to trial by jury was in danger and that mandamus was therefore
warranted. 8
Judge Oakes, dissenting in Goldman, argued that the extraordin-
ary remedy of mandamus could not be justified solely on the basis of
"doubt" raised by dictum; indeed, Judge Oakes himself felt sufficiently
unencumbered by Crane to cite Rachal for the proposition that "one
who timely requests the right to a jury trial will not be collaterally es-
topped from exercising it by earlier resolution of the issues in a non-
jury trial.17 6  Oakes suggested that if the majority was intent upon
establishing a contrary rule for the Second Circuit, it should have
waited until Goldman, Sachs had actually been estopped in Welch.
Only then, according to Judge Oakes, would the issues raised by Ra-
chal and Crane have properly been before the court."7
The Goldman majority did place itself in an awkward position by
flirting with the dictum in Crane before Goldman, Sachs had become
estopped; for while it suggested -that Goldman, Sachs' right to a jury
trial in Welch might not have been so compelling as to overcome the
collateral estoppel effect of an adverse judgment in Franklin, the court
ruled that this right was sufficiently compelling to warrant the protec-
tion of mandamus. This tension in the Goldman decision can be traced
to the Second Circuit's earlier analysis of the Beacon Theatres case in
Crane, where the court concluded that the Supreme Court had au-
thorized mandamus because jury trial considerations would not limit
the application of collateral estoppel principles.7  The Goldman court
71. Id. at 343 n.15.
72. 494 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1974).
73. Id. at 78. See quotation accompanying note 71 supra.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 79.
77. Id.
78. See note 69 supra. Under the Crane analysis, the fate of a: litigant's jury rights
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feared that under the Crane analysis, any adverse findings by a trial
judge in Franklin might be binding on Goldman, Sachs in subsequent
litigation. 9 It was in order to avert this threat to Goldman, Sachs' jury
rights that the court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus directing
the district courtito try Welch first.80
Another route may have been open to the Goldman court in its
efforts to safeguard the constitutional right to trial by jury. The Second
Circuit could have denied mandamus on the grounds that Crane did
not require that Goldman, Sachs be collaterally estopped. Rather than
invoking the dictum in Crane which had been critical of the Rachal
holding,8 the Second Circuit could have established some distance be-
tween Crane and the Goldman case by distinguishing Rachal on its
facts. Whereas Goldman involved two successive claims for money
damages, neither of which had been adjudicated, the Rachal court had
to decide whether to bind the defendants in a damage suit to the find-
ings of a prior SEC injunction action. Significantly, this SEC action
carried no right to a jury trial, 2 defendants did not waive their jury
rights at any point throughout the course of the Rachal litigation, and
there was apparently no misunderstanding among the parties as to
which case would be tried first.83 In contrast, Goldman, Sachs was
depends on whether the question of damages arises before or after a trial judge has deter-
mined the matter of liability. 490 F.2d at 341-42. If a case is still pending, then man-
damus is an appropriite remedy for preserving the right to trial by jury; but once an
equitable claim has been adjudicated, collateral estoppel principles may be applied in der-
ogation of that right. See Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 34, at 446-47.
79. The dictum in Crane raised some "doubt" in the mind of the majority as to
whether Goldman, Sachs would be estopped in Welch. See text accompanying note 74
supra. The majority presumably feared that the district judge might also have his
doubts.
Judge Oakes did not consider estoppel in Welch likely, since the district judge had
already refused to delay Franklin upon arguments identical to those presented to the
court of appeals. 494 F.2d at 79. Yet in denying Goldman, Sachs' motion for a stay,
the district judge had concluded that "by failing to demand a jury trial in Franklin, de-
fendants assumed the risk that an adverse decision in Franklin might have preclusive
effect in a subsequent action." Brief for Petitioners, app. C at 2.
80. As Judge Oakes pointed out, the grant of mandamus did not guarantee Goldman,
Sachs the right to issue resolution by a jury in Welch. Under the terms of the majority's
own analysis, Goldman, Sachs still could have been estopped by an adverse judgment
in any of the actions pending against it outside of the Second Circuit. 494 F.2d at 79.
81. While the Crane court voiced its reservations as to the Rachal holding in dic-
tum, the extent of its disapproval should not be minimized. The cases probably cannot
be reconciled. See note 70 supra. More importantly, the contrasting interpretations of
Beacon Theatres by the Second Circuit and the Fifth Circuit will necessarily yield op-
posite results whenever a court is asked to rule on a plea of collateral estoppel. Com-
pare notes 69 & 78 supra with text accompanying notes 30-33 supra and note 34 supra.
82. See Shapiro & C~quillette, supra note 34, at 449 n.27.
83. Although the Fifth Circuit suggested that Rachal and Hunnicutt would have ro-
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entitled to a jury trial in Franklin but waived its rights. To the extent
that this waiver was made in reliance upon the anticipated order of
trials,14 the Second Circuit could have concluded that findings in
Franklin adverse to Goldman, Sachs would be tainted for collateral
estoppel purposes.85 The court thereby could have freed Goldman,
ceived a jury trial on the issue of liability if Hill had been a party plaintiff in the SEC
action, nothing in the Rachal opinion indicates that joinder of the two claims was ac-
tually considered. 435 F.2d at 63-64.
84. See note 9 supra.
85. Federal courts have adopted the "full and fair opportunity" test for determining
whether a litigant should be bound to the findings of an earlier suit in which it has par-
ticipated. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. In applying this test courts have
examined with particularity the facts of a given case, and a wide variety of factors have
been recognized as grounds for allowing relitigation of an issue. See note 25 supra and
accompanying text.
The Second Circuit adopted the case-by-case approach implicit in the "full and fair
opportunity" test in Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964). That case involved the proper construction
of a written employment contract. After the employer had lost a suit brought by one
group of employees, other employees instituted a second suit and sought to bind the em-
ployer to findings in the earlier judgment. The Zdanok court found that the employer
fully expected its rights to be governed by the construction of the contract in the first
case, and on this basis the court concluded that there would be no unfairness in estopping
the employer from seeking another interpretation. 327 F.2d at 953-56. See also Rosen-
berg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 525-26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973) (pri-
vate party defendant in civil action may raise findings of earlier proceeding in which op-
ponent was convicted of criminal violations); Ritchie v. Landau, 475 F.2d 151, 155 n.3
(2d Cir. 1973) (defendant may raise findings of prior arbitration proceeding to which it
was not a party, even though the party resisting estoppel did not choose the arbitration
forum); United States v. Fabric Garment Co., 366 F.2d 530, 534 (2d Cir. 1966) (gov.
emnment may raise prior criminal conviction in a subsequent civil suit against same party
defendant); Kurlan v. Commissioner, 343 F.2d 625, 628-29 n.1 (2d Cir. 1965) (require-
ment that only final judgments may be given collateral estoppel effect is not inflexible);
Fleischer v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 329 F.2d 424, 425 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 835 (1964) (defendant in federal court may raise findings of previous state adjudi-
cation against persons who were parties there); Goldstein v. Doft, 236 F. Supp. 730, 734
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd, 353 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960 (1966)
(findings in arbitration proceeding may be given full collateral estoppel effect).
In Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 538-41 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966), the Second Circuit refused to apply col-
lateral estoppel principles on the basis that the first of two actions had not been strenu-
ously litigated. Several actions for damages arising out of a plane crash were brought
against defendant airline company. In one action on a claim of $500,000, defendants
won a jury verdict. The case was reversed on appeal, however, and upon remand a new
jury awarded plaintiffs $35,000. No appeal was taken from the second verdict. In a
subsequent action brought by a different plaintiff on a claim of over $7,000,000, the Ber-
ner court refused to estop defendants from relitigating the issue of liability. The court
observed that defendants had good reason for not appealing their ultimate loss in the
first action since remand would have made them vulnerable to a larger award by a third
jury. 346 F.2d at 540. On this basis the court concluded that the liability issue had
not been litigated strenuously enough in the first action, and that the airline company
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Sachs to contest its liability in Welch, even if it were to suffer an ad-
verse judgment in Franklin.
The Second Circuit did not seize upon the fact that Goldman,
Sachs' waiver of jury rights distinguished Goldman from Rachal.s0 It
elected instead to renew its attack on the Fifth Circuit case, justifying
the extraordinary remedy of mandamus on the basis of dictum in
Crane which had been critical of the Rachal result8'7 Since what little
support Rachal has generated outside of the Second Circuit has been
did not evidence an intention to be bound by the findings there in subsequent litigation.
Id. at 540-41.
The absence of an intention to be bound may have also influenced the inclination
of the Second Circuit to discount the likelihood of collateral estoppel in Minichiello
v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
In that case the court held that there would be no violation of due process
where a New York long-arm statute asserted jurisdiction over a nonresident motorist to
the extent of his coverage under a liability insurance policy issued by a company doing
business in New York. In contesting jurisdiction, the defendant had pointed out that
the claim against him exceeded the policy limits of his insurance. He feared that if
the resident plaintiff were later to acquire personal jurisdiction over him in another state,
the plaintiff could bind him to an adverse New York judgment in a subsequent suit for
the balance of the claim. However, the Second Circuit declared that such an application
of collateral estoppel principles would be unconstitutional. 410 F.2d at 112. See Men-
endez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1363-64 (2d Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed sub
nom. Republic of Cuba v. Saks & Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 3529 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1974) (Nos.
73-1287, 89) (no collateral estoppel effect to an out-of-court agreement where parties
did not evidence an intention to be bound); Fink v. Coates, 323 F. Supp. 988, 990
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (no collateral estoppel where party opposed forum of first action and
defended against relatively small claim); cf. Colditz v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 329 F.
Supp. 691, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (no collateral estoppel where jury verdict was appar-
ently influenced by sympathy for a party); Costello v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1384, 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (no collateral estoppel where finding
in prior adjudication was not necessary to the judgment there).
The Second Circuit has not yet addressed the question whether an opportunity to
be heard remains "full and fair" after a party in Goldman, Sachs' position has waived
its jury rights. However, by taking the approach that it did, the Goldman court has
left open the possibility that future litigants will be collaterally estopped under similar
circumstances. See note 87 infra.
86. In its unsuccessful attempt to have the district court stay Franklin, Goldman,
Sachs had advanced arguments identical to those that ultimately persuaded the Second
Circuit. 494 F.2d at 79. The district court distinguished Goldman from Beacon The-
atres, Rachal, Cannon, and Crane on the basis that Goldman, Sachs had waived its right
to a jury trial in Franklin, but the court did not speculate as to the reasons for waiver.
Brief for Petitioners, app. C at 1-2.
87. See notes 71-74, 78-80 supra and accompanying text. The Goldman majority
was clearly concerned about the jury waiver in Franklin. See note 9 supra. However,
by taking the approach that it did, the court may have provided the basis for estopping
future litigants in Goldman, Sachs' position who do not seek mandamus. If a party were
to accede to a non-jury trial on the assumption that it would not be bound in subsequent
litigation, the fact that it had waived its jury rights may be of no avail once judgment
in the non-jury trial has been entered.
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limited to situations in which there has been no right to a jury trial in
the first of two successive proceedings, 8 it is difficult to gauge what
impact Goldman will have on other circuits. Within the Second Cir-
cuit, however, Rachal no doubt stands discredited, as does the notion
that a litigant can avoid collateral estoppel whenever its right to trial
by jury would be compromised.
Goldman, Sachs clearly appreciated the importance of a timely assertion of the
right to jury trial. See Brief for Petitioners at 18-19. Thus, after it had lost a jury
verdict in Welch, see note 12 supra, Goldman, Sachs sought to further delay Franklin
until the completion of every one of the jury cases pending against it in the Southern
District of New York. But Judge Edelstein again refused to order a stay. He con-
cluded, upon studying the Goldman opinion "in an effort to ascertain the extent of
its prohibitions," that to proceed with the trial in Franklin would not violate the terms
of the Second Circuit's analysis. Franklin Say. Bank v. Levy, Civil No. 71-882 (DNE)
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1974). Goldman, Sachs again petitioned the court of appeals for
a writ of mandamus, and the Second Circuit granted mandamus for a second time,
deferring Franklin "until completion of jury trials of common issues in related cases."
Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Edelstein, No. 74-2512 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 1974). By issuing
an order of such broad scope, the Second Circuit further indicated its apparent de-
termination to reject the Rachal rule against applying collateral estoppel principles in
derogation of the right to jury trial.
88. See notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text.
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